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Abstrat
In this paper, a model of bounded rational investors investing their
portfolio in a passive investment vehile (e.g., an Exhange Traded
Fund repliating a broad index) or an atively managed fund is pre-
sented. The model proposes that the quik reswithing of these short-
term oriented investors indues momentum behavior in pries. In-
vestors prefer passsive funds in time of low risk-free rates and when
ative funds harge high management osts. Atively managed funds
have a lower volatility but are only able to outperform the passive
funds in downturns. Simulations onrm the emergene of two regimes:
a regime where pries are lose to fundamentals and another regime
with a positive bubble. The size and the length of this bubble in-
reases for low market liquidity and high swithing speed of investors.
The market volatility inreases for strong reswithing ativities and
short-term thinking of bounded rational investors. Negative bubbles
(market pries lower than fundamentals) tend to our if ative port-
folio managers exhibit high risk aversion, but are less frequent than
positive bubbles.
JEL lassiation: G11 - C15 - C62 - D58
Keywords: stok market - passive trading - nanial stability - arbi-
trage trading - nanial bubbles - Heterogeneous Agent Model
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1 Introdution
Reent years have seen a sharp inrease in passive investment vehiles. This
inrease was motivated by the lassi portfolio theory results in the sense of
Markowitz (1952) showing that by holding the market portfolio idiosynrati
risk an be hedged away and overall risk an be redued to the market risk.
Furthermore, empirial studies suh as Lakonishok et al. (1992) or Malkiel
(1995) show that ative portfolio management underperformed a broad index
suh as the S&P 500. These results are also losely related to the Eient
Market Hypothesis (EMH): in its strong form, it states that the return of an
atively managed fund should equal the return of a passively managed fund
not aounting for fund management ost. This is beause the hypothesis
states that markets are eient in the sense that there are no exess returns
to be ahieved by stok piking. The semi-strong form (whih aounts for
the fat of inside information) states that the return of an atively managed
fund should equal the return of a passively managed fund after aounting
for fund management osts. This at least aepts that ative portfolio man-
agement does not destroy value, though it does not yield exess returns. This
argument was put forward in the theoreti model of Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) showing the higher returns of informed investors are perfetly oset
by the osts of aquiring the information.
Baked by eonomi literature, the so-alled Exhange Traded Funds
(ETFs) beame one of the best-selling nanial innovations in reent years.
Initially reated in Northern Ameria and then spilling over into Europe,
these produts allow non-institutional investors to partiipate in various
broad markets suh as equity, xed investment, and ommodities (Kosev
and Williams, 2011). Beside the diversiation aspet and the low manage-
ment osts, these produts provide tax advantages. Compared to standard
passive investment produts (suh as mutual funds), ETFs also exhibit high
trading liquidity whih goes along with low traking error risk. ETF trading
also allows for naked short-selling, stop-loss orders, and buying on margin
(Deville, 2008). In fat, ETFs are more liquid than their underlying stoks
(Deville, 2008).
A very important aspet of ETFs is their reation proess. Classi plain
vanilla ETFs similiar to standard passive investment vehiles require the
buying of the underlying shares for the reation of new stoks of ETFs (Ra-
maswamy, 2011). The urrent trend (espeially in Europe) leads to a replae-
ment of these lassi physial ETFs by new syntheti forms. These forms do
not require holding the asset repliated by the produt but allow for holding
an optimized basket of seurities. This may generate additional inome to
the issuer of the ETF and requires the use of more omplex nanial produts
1
suh as swaps and other derivatives. Syntheti ETFs pose the advantage that
they help to invest in illiquid markets (e.g., emerging markets). This higher
liquidity also ontributes to lower traking error risk
1
. On the other hand,
these benets go along with a ounterparty risk. Private households trying
to invest in a broad stok index in order to hedge away idiosynrati risk of
stok piking expose their portfolio to opaque risks of omplex derivatives by
investing in ETFs. These subjets are extensively disussed in urrent liter-
ature (e.g., Ramaswamy (2011)). This should be kept in mind even though
it is not the fous of the model presented in this paper.
We model the interation of ative and passive trading in a framework
similar to a Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM) now widely used in nane.
These models mostly onsider the interation of trend-following hartist tra-
ders and stabilizing fundamentalist traders to explain the behavior of asset
pries
2
. For our model, we borrow the two basi assumptions, namely that
agents are heterogeneous and exhibit bounded rationality. We assume that
funds manage other people's money and thereby introdue a delegation prob-
lem into the model. Non-professional investors subjet to bounded rationality
and short-term thinking deide whether to invest their portfolio in an ative
vehile or to hold it in a passive fund. The model is able to repliate the em-
pirial behavior found in a reent paper by Raddatz and Shmukler (2011),
showing that injetions into and redemptions out of passive funds are pro-
ylial and thereby impose possibly destabilizing behavior into markets
3
.
This is espeially the ase for emerging ountries suering from sudden stops
of apital inow in times of rises (Raddatz and Shmukler, 2011). The major
result of the model is that the interation of the these traders in the presene
of bounded rational investors an generate a stable yle in asset pries with
positive bubbles. The degree and the length of the bubble is mainly driven by
the illiquidity of the market and the reswithing speed of the investors. Neg-
ative bubbles (pries below fundamentals) are less frequent and only appear
for strong risk aversion of ative traders. The volatility inreases for short-
term thinking and strong reswithing of the bounded rational investors. A
nanial transation tax in the sense of Tobin (1978) on the seondary market
might redue the portfolio rebalaning ativities, while the higher illiquidity
1
The mispriing of mutual funds relative to their underlying index, also known as
mutual fund puzzle, is partly explained by the illiquidity of the asset (Shleifer, 2000).
2
These models are intensly disussed in reent surveys suh as Hommes and Wagener
(2009), Lux (2009) and Chiarella et al. (2009).
3
A similar rationale has been presented in the paper of Vayanos and Woolley (2008)
explaining the behavior of over and underreation in a framework where investors reshift
their portfolio between ative and passive funds.
2
on the primary market due to the tax eventually inreases the size of the
bubble.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next setion
presents the basi model formulation, whilst setion 3 presents basi simula-
tion results. In setion 4 and 5, we present an analytial and simulation-based
disussion of the attrativeness of dierent strategies driving the prie dy-
namis and the bubble state and dynamis. The last setion onludes and
gives indiation for future researh.
2 Formulation of the two-trader model with boun-
ded rational investors
In addition to the lassi representation of a HAM, we furthermore introdue
a delegation problem. Funds do not manage their own holdings but other
people's money. These other people may be thought of as small investors that
trust in the expertise of their fund managers. They have to hoose between
either investing in a passive fund (e.g., an ETF) or an atively managed
fund. These small investors are subjet to bounded rationality in the sense
of Simon (1955): due to their limited resoures of time and money they hoose
a suboptimal strategy. The portfolio weights W it at time t of the strategy
i ∈ {p, a} with p indiating a passive and a indiating an ative strategy
are alulated aording to the Multinominal Logit Model as presented in
Manski and MFadden (1981):
W it =
eγA
i
t∑n
i=1 e
γAit
(1)
The appliation of the Multinominal Logit Model as a strategy-swithing
model was introdued in Brok and Hommes (1997), whilst its appliation in
the nanial market ontext dates bak to Brok and Hommes (1998). This
weight depends on the attrativeness Ait of a strategy and the rationality
γ > 0 of the agents. In the ase where γ equals zero, the weights of the
groups are onstant and amount to 1/2. The other extreme ase with γ
onverging to innity represents the ase in whih all individuals hoose
the optimal foreast. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) therefore interpret
this parameter as a model of the behavioral eet of Status Quos Bias as
presented in Kahneman et al. (1991). This eet implies that individuals
nd it diult to hange a deision rule they used in the past.
3
The attrativeness of a strategy is measured by its returns. Aordingly,
the attrativeness of the passive strategy is a funtion of the market return,
whih in a rst order approximation equals the dierene of log-pries p4:
Apt+1 = rt + λA
p
t−1 ≈ (pt − pt−1) + λA
p
t = (ln(Pt)− ln(Pt−1)) + λA
p
t
= ln
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
+ λApt = ln(1 + r) + λA
p
t
(2)
In this ase, apital letters (Pt = exp(pt)) represent real pries. The parame-
ter 0 < λ < 1 an be seen as the memory of agents. High values of λ indiate
long-term memory. More formally, the expression (1− λ) an be interpreted
as the time disounting i of individuals5. This implies that the value of λ
should be lose to one.
The attrativeness of the ative strategy is more ompliated, sine fund
managers atively shift between risky stoks and risk-free asset with a return
of rf,t. The weight of assets holdings w
q
t is given by the following equation
6
:
wqt =
qAt Pt
qAt · Pt + Ct
(3)
It represents the ratio of the number of assets held by ative traders qAt in
real market pries Pt and ash Ct (in the unit of money). By also onsidering
the management osts of ative portfolio management κ (in base points), this
yields the following attrativeness:
AAt+1 = w
q
t−1rt + (1− w
q
t−1)rf,t − κ + λA
A
t (4)
The trading osts κ an initially be attributed to transation osts ative
portfolio managers fae due to ative shifting between risk-free and risky
asset. As we will see in the following, ative portfolio managers have features
of fundamental traders of lassi HAMs who try to buy undervalued and sell
overvalued seurities. In order to do so, they have to know the fundamental
value of seurities. To gain this inside information (inside in the sense of not
4
In a rst-order Taylor approximation the following relation holds: ln(1 + rt) = rt +
O(r2t ).
5
If we interpret the rate of return as a ash-ow CF and assume the transversality
ondition, the following result an be derived: At = λAt−1 +CFt = λ(λAt−2 + CFt−1) +
CFt =
∑t
n=0 CFt−nλ
n
. If this equals a standard disounted ash ow with time preferene
rate i, the following relation beomes apparent:
∑t
n=0 CFt−nλ
n =
∑t
n=0
CFt−n
(1+i)n ⇒ λ =
1
1+i ≈ 1− i.
6
Note that apital letters W it measure the portfolio weight of investors in ative and
passive strategy, whilst lower ase letters wit desribe the portfolio omposition of ative
traders onsisting of risk-free ash and risky asset.
4
being publily available), they hire professionals to ondut market researh.
These researh osts to unravel the log-fundamental value ft are also reeted
in the osts κ. Note that, more preisely, the osts κ are the exess osts of
ative trading relative to passive trading. Passive trading also yields osts,
but usually at at small negletable order of parts per thousands annually.
The demand of the ative trader is very similar to the demand of funda-
mental traders in lassi HAMs. In fat, it models the strategy of so-alled
alpha-seeking of hedge funds, implying that they buy undervalued, whilst
selling overvalued seurities sine they expet that pries onverge to their
log-fundamental value ft. The dierene of log-fundamental value and topi
log-prie pt in a rst-order approximation an therefore be thought of as an
expeted return. If this expeted return is higher than the risk-free rate rf,t,
they shift their holdings to risky stoks, implying a positive demand (dAt > 0):
dAt = α(ft − pt − rf,t) + at (5)
The parameter α > 0 an be interpreted as a the inverse risk aversion of
ative traders. In ase they are risk-averse (low values of α) they refrain from
taking strong positions. Furthermore, the demand proess is superimposed
by a noisy proess at ∼ N(0, σa). This aptures the feature of noise trading
as advoated in the seminal work by Blak (1986)
7
. Noise plays a ruial
part in nanial markets. Even smart traders (in our ase the ative traders)
have a noisy omponent whih on mean should anel itself out (Shleifer,
2000)
8
. The noise term therefore relaxes the strong assumption that ative
traders know the fundamental value exatly, in the form that they only know
it orretly on mean and are subjet to noise.
Sine the demand for risky asset represents the hange in stok of risky
asset, equation 5 desribes the ow of risky asset for ative traders. The
stok of risky asset held by ative trades qAt is presented in the following
equation:
qAt = q
A
t−1 +W
A
t d
A
t + w
q
t−1DW
A
t (6)
The seond term in this equation shows that the demand of ative trading is
weighted with their market share WAt . This assumption ommonly used in
HAMs ensures that a group that does not have a market share annot exeute
trading ativities. Conversely, a group that has a strong market share an
take strong positions in the market. The new aspet of this model is the third
term: investors an shift their holding into or out of atively managed funds
7
More tehnially, the introdution of noise leads to endogenous prie movements. Sine
we assume that pries are initially equal to their fundamental value, there would not be
any prie movements in the simulation without noise.
8
This is taken into aount by assuming E(at) = 0.
5
DWAt . If there is a ash-inow into the atively managed funds (DW
A
t > 0),
managers build up positions in risky asset without hanging their portfolio
omposition of risky and risk-free assets.
On the other side, ative funds hold ash Ct. If they buy an amount q
A
t
of risky asset at urrent market prie Pt, this redues ash and vie versa.
Moreover, the ash-inow DWAt is partly held in ash in order to keep the
ratio of ash and risky asset onstant. These ideas an be summarized in the
following equation
9
:
Ct = Ct−1 −W
A
t d
A
t Pt +w
C
t−1DW
A
t Pt = Ct−1 −W
A
t d
A
t Pt + (1−w
q
t−1)DW
A
t Pt
(7)
These two equations imply that the total ow (in number of assets) in the
ative fund equals the ow of assets due to portfolio shifting of the investors
between passive and ative funds
10
:
C˙t
Pt
+ q˙At = DW
A
t (8)
This also implies that only the demand of ative trading dAt hanges the
omposition of the portfolio of ative traders
11
. These basi ideas of the
omplete model are also illustrated in gure 1.
Using the ow equations of ash and risky asset we an also implement
short-sale and ash-onstraints in our model. However, as we will see in the
following simulation results they are not of importane.
We now want to investigate the passive traders. Sine passive traders
follow a buy and hold strategy, they do not engage in ative trading. They
only inrease their demand for risky asset (they do not hold risk-free ash)
if they have inow into their funds. Sine we only assume two investment
opportunities, an inow in passive investment equals an outow of ative
funds and vie versa (DW Pt = −DW
A
t ):
qPt = q
P
t−1 +DW
P
t = q
P
t−1 −DW
A
t (9)
9
Note that this formulation neglets the eet of the risk-free return. If we take it
into aount, the equation should be as follows: Ct = (1 + rf,t)Ct−1 −W
A
t d
A
t Pt + (1 −
w
q
t−1)DW
A
t Pt. The risk-free rate is negleted in this ase sine (at least on a daily basis)
it is lose to zero.
10
To transform the dierene equation into a dierential equation we take the following
assumption for ow of ash (and similar for ow of assets): C˙t = Ct − Ct−1.
11
This an be understood if we insert the ow of assets equation 6 and the ow of
ash equation 7 into equation 3 representing the portfolio weights of the ative traders:
w
q
t =
Pt(q
A
t−1+W
A
t d
A
t +w
q
t−1
DWAt )
Ct−1+Pt(qAt−1+DW
A
t )
. In absene of ative demand dAt , the omposition of the
portfolio remains onstant(w
q
t = w
q
t−1).
6
Figure 1: Struture of the model
Total demand equals the sum of ow in risky asset by ative and pas-
sive traders. Exess demand feeds bak into returns and prie levels. We
follow the onventional modeling approah in the HAM literature (p. e.g.,
Chiarella et al. (2006), Westerho (2008)) and model market learing with a
stylized version of a market maker. The key idea is that there is an institu-
tion named market maker that takes an osetting long or short position to
assure that exess demand in period t equals zero. In the next period, the
market maker announes a new log-prie pt+1 to redue exess demand. The
parameter µ an thereby be interpreted as market illiquidity. In illquid times,
µ is very high, yielding strong prie hanges for a given exess demand:
pt+1 = pt + µ(q˙
A
t + q˙
P
t ) = pt + µ(W
A
t d
A
t + w
q
t−1DW
A
t −DW
A
t )
= pt + µ(W
A
t d
A
t − (1− w
q
t−1)DW
A
t ) = pt + µ(W
A
t d
A
t + (1− w
q
t−1)DW
P
t )
(10)
The presented equation implies that pries not only inrease if ative traders
try to take long positions (in ase of undervalued seurities), but also if there
is a ow of funds into passive trading. The latter eet is promoted if ative
funds hold large proportions in ash (whih happens if they believe that
7
risky asset is overvalued and will fall soon). Note that the whole model is
stok-ow onsistent, meaning that the total holding of investors in risky and
risk-free asset is onstant
12
:
Pt(q˙
A
t + q˙
P
t ) + C˙t = Pt(W
A
t d
A
t + (1− w
q
t−1)DW
P
t −W
A
t d
A
t + (1− w
q
t−1)DW
A
t )
= (1− wqt−1)(DW
A
t +DW
P
t )Pt = 0
(11)
The key omponent of the model is the hange in investors' portfolio
omposition DW Pt :
DW Pt =
1
τ
(W Pt −W
P
t−1) (12)
Basially, this measures the hange in amount of investment held when pursu-
ing the passive strategy. Its weight inreases if bounded rational investors at-
tribute a high attrativeness to the passive strategy. We further introdue the
parameter τ > 1 whih aptures the frequeny with whih investors reevalu-
ate their portfolio holdings. The hange of portfolio omposition is therefore
diluted over τ periods of time. The lower this parameter, the stronger the
investors reat to hanges in pereived attrativeness.
This setion presented the basi model. In the following, we want to in-
vestigate the results of the model both on a simulation basis and analytially.
3 Basi simulation results
The model presented onsists of many parameters and initial onditions -
both tehnial and behavioral. The alibration of the latter is ompliated
sine they annot be observed diretly in empirial data. One strong sim-
plifying assumption of the simulation is that the log-fundamental value is
onstant and equals zero (f = 0). We alibrate the model so that one dis-
rete step size represents one trading day. In the rst instane, the daily
risk-free rate is assumed to be onstant, implying that the risk-free asset
is in innite supply (rf,t = rf = 0.02%). Daily osts of ative trading are
slightly below the risk-free rate (κ = 0.01%)13. The behavioral parameters
are set aording to several HAM (p. e.g., De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006),
Westerho (2008)). We set the memory to λ = 0.98, rationality to γ = 500,
and inverse risk aversion of ative traders to α = 0.1. The latter parameter
an also be interpreted in the way that ative traders expet the pries to
onverge to fundamental value within
1
α
= 10 trading days. The investor
12
This results from equations 7, 6, and 9.
13
On an annual basis, these values represent rf ≈ 5% and κ ≈ 2.5%.
8
valuation frequeny is set to τ = 5, implying that investors rebalane their
portfolio weekly (e.g., on the weekend) and traders an thereby dilute the
onsequential demand over one week. Noise variane σ2a is set to 0.005 and
market liquidity µ to 1. We assume that the initial attrativeness of both
strategies equals zero, resulting in the fat that both strategies have the same
initial market share. Therefore, we impose that they have the same amount
of asset holding, where ative funds hold 60 % perent in ash and the rest in
risky asset (wq0 = 0.4 = 1−w
C
0 ). We further assume that simulation initially
starts in the fundamental value (p = f = 0).
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Figure 2: Panel 1: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft; Panel 2: Portfolio
weight of ative WAt and passive W
P
t trade strategies; Panel 3: Assets and
ash held by ative and passive traders (stok); Panel 4: Demand by ative
traders and portfolio balaning by both strategies (ow)
One exemplary simulation result is presented in gure 2. Two dierent
regimes emerge: in one ase the market onsists of ative traders only and
pries are lose to fundamentals. In the opposite ase, there are only passive
traders and risky asset is overvalued
14
. The risky asset portfolio balaning
14
Note that the simulation shows the fast growing of a bubble with a slower derease bak
to fundamental value, implying a positive skewness of the return distribution. This result
9
of ative and passive traders have the opposite sign, while the balaning of
passive traders has a higher amplitude. This an be explained by the fat
that the latter only hold risky asset and in ontrast to ative traders are
not invested in ash. It is also worth notiing that the amount of assets
and ash also swings around two states. Both ash onstraint and short-sale
onstraint do not beome binding. A ash onstraint might ome into eet
for the ative traders when they try to take long positions. This is the ase
when they believe that the asset is undervalued. But as seen in the simulation
in periods of low pries, there is a ow of funds into ative funds. Moreover,
as pries are low the existing ash an be utilized more eetively
15
. On
the other side ative traders try to go short in times of bubbles. Yet, as
seen in the numerial results, in these times they have no market weight and
therefore annot engage in trading ativity making the short-sale onstraint
not binding
16
.
Now we want to ompare the attrativeness of both strategies (see gure
3). The passive investment strategy shows higher volatility than the ative
strategy. This implies that ative portfolio balaning in eonomi downturns
is more protable than a simple buy and hold strategy. This an be ex-
plained by the fat that ative portfolio managers also hold risk-free asset
whih most of the time yields lower returns than the risky asset but pay out
in downturns. On the other side, the market is fairly eient and ative
portfolio managers are only suking nikels by trying to prot from arbitrage
opportunities. Consistent with the EMH, in the long run the market annot
be outperformed. In business pratie, atively managed funds lever up their
investment return by replaing equity with debt. This important eet is not
disussed here but should be onsidered in future researh.
Until now, we onsidered risk-neutral investors sine they only deided
on portfolio omposition aording to returns. In the following, we want to
introdue a risk-adjusted measurement to ompare ative and passive trad-
ing. This is also loser to the denition of the EMH in the sense of Jensen
(1978), who laries that in an eient market it is not possible to make
risk-adjusted prots by arbitrage trading.
is disonrmed by empirial studies (and standard HAMs e.g., Lux (2009)) measuring
negative skewness of return distribution and thereby represents a major shortoming of
this model. This eet an be attributed to the properties of the weighting mehanism
and will be further disussed in the following setions.
15
This an also be seen if we look at the ash onstraint equation resulting from the
ow of ash equation 7: dAt ≤
1
PtW
A
t
(Ct−1 + (1− w
q
t−1)DW
A
t ).
16
This also beomes lear from the inequality desribing the short-sale onstraint and
resulting from equation 6: dAt ≥ −
1
WAt
(qAt−1 + w
q
t−1DW
A
t )
10
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Figure 3: Panel 1: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft; Panel 2: Attrative-
ness of passive APt and ative trading strategy A
A
t ; Panel 3: Sharpe Ratio of
passive SRPt and ative strategy SR
A
t
A ombined risk-return measure frequently used in business pratie is
the so-alled Sharpe Ratio (SRit), onsidering a ratio of exess return and
volatility as measured in standard deviation of returns
17
:
SRit =
Ait − rf,t
σt(Ai)
(13)
We plot the Sharpe Ratio for the dierent strategies in the third panel of
gure 3. The intriguing result is that the Sharpe Ratios are nearly idential
for both strategies as alluded by the EMH denition of Jensen (1978).
We an also feedbak the Sharpe Ratio in the model. In order to do so, we
replae the attrativeness Ait of a strategy with its Sharpe Ratio SR
i
t in the
17
For estimating the volatility, we use the maximum likelihood estimator for onstant
variane (Hull, 2010) σ2t (A
i) = 1
n
∑n
j=1(A
i
t−j)
2
. This is atually the moving average of
the squared returns. Long window lengths n result in low pereived volatilities. We set
n = 100. This leads to the eet that we annot give values for the Sharpe-Ratio in the
rst 100 simulation periods. The measure itself varies over time.
11
weighting equation 1. The ase with weights aording to the attrativeness
an therefore also be interpreted as the ase with risk-neutral investors. The
simulation results are depited in gure 4
18
. One again, the Sharpe Ratios
of both strategies are lose together. On average, the ative trading is more
attrative leading to the fat that pries are lose to fundamentals. Never-
theless, one again periods of overpriing assoiated with high attrativeness
and therefore also high weight of passive traders emerge.
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Figure 4: Panel 1: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft; Panel 2: Portfolio
weight of ative WAt and passive W
P
t trade strategies; Panel 3: Assets and
ash held by ative and passive traders (stok); Panel 4: Sharpe Ratio SRit
of ative and passive strategy
In the next setion, we want to take a loser look at what drives the
attrativeness of the dierent strategies and thereby also governs the prie
dynamis.
18
This simulation assumes the same parameters as in the rst ase, exept for γ = 25.
The latter is made to sale down the Sharpe Ratio SRit to a size omparable to the
attrativenessAit. Furthermore, we also hold the random seed of the noisy proess onstant
to ontrol for this eet.
12
4 Determinants of long-run trading suess
To analyze the suess of a trading strategy we want to go one step bak
and aount for the simple attrativeness measure instead of the Sharpe
Ratio. In the rst instane, we want to assume extreme short-term thinking
or no memory (λ = 0). Starting from equation 2, this yields the following
attrativeness for passive traders:
Apt = rt = p˙t (14)
This means that attrativeness is high in ases of high returns leading to a
higher weight of passive strategy in investors' portfolios. Another intriguing
result is found for perfet memory or no disounting (λ = 1)19:
A˙Pt = rt = p˙t ⇒ A
P
t = pt (15)
This implies that the passive strategy is always more attrative if pries are
at a high level. Sine, in ontrast to ative traders, investors do not know
the fundamental value, they are not aware of potential mispriings. This
approah is more appropriate than the rst one sine the value of λ is lose
to one, reeting that the daily disount rate i ≈ 1− λ is lose to zero.
In the model itself rather than the absolute value Ait the relative value of
attrativeness Ut = A
P
t −A
A
t is important. This also translates to the fat that
instead of the absolute weight W it the dierene in weights mt = W
P
t −W
A
t
matters. We an follow the well-established approah of Brok and Hommes
(1998) and replae the Logit Model with a tanh-funtion:
mt =
eγA
P
t − eγA
A
t
eγA
P
t + eγA
A
t
=
eγ(A
P
t −A
A
t ) − 1
eγ(A
P
t −A
A
t ) + 1
=
eγUt − 1
eγUt + 1
= tanh
(γ
2
Ut
)
(16)
In this equation, positive dierene in attrativeness (Ut = A
P
t − A
A
t > 0)
leads to a higher weight of passive traders (W Pt > W
A
t ) and vie versa. This
dierene in attrativeness is given as follows:
Ut = A
P
t − A
A
t =
pt − pt−1 + λA
P
t−1 −
[
wqt−1(pt − pt−1) + (1− w
q
t−1)rf − κ+ λA
A
t−1
]
=
(1− wqt−1)(pt − pt−1 − rf) + κ+ λ(A
P
t−1 −A
A
t−1)
(17)
In this ase, we an one again onsider the extreme ases for the memory
λ. We start by analyzing the situation with no memory (λ = 0):
Ut = (1− w
q
t−1)(rt − rf) + κ = w
C
t−1(rt − rf) + κ (18)
19
This result an be derived if we onsider the initial onditions of the simulation AP0 =
p0 = 0.
13
In this senario, ative trading an only be more suessful (Ut < 0) if the
risk-free return is higher than the return of the risky asset (rf > rt). This is
only the ase in downturns. This eet is pronouned if ative traders hold
large proportions in ash wCt−1 and only harge low management osts κ. The
exat ondition requires exess return of ash to risky asset weighted with
its portfolio weight to be higher than the management osts:
(rf − rt)w
C
t−1 ≥ κ (19)
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Figure 5: Panel 1: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft with varying risk-free
rate rf ; Panel 2: Relative attrativeness Ut with varying risk-free rate rf ;
Panel 3: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft with varying management osts
κ; Panel 4: Relative attrativeness Ut with varying management osts κ
In the other extreme ase, agents have perfet memory λ = 1. We an
derive the following result
20
:
U˙ = wC(p˙−rf )+κ⇒ U = w
C(p−rf · t)+κ · t = w
C ·p+(κ−wC ·rf )t (20)
20
Note that we skip the time indies. This is the ase sine we onsider a dierential
equation instead of a dierene equation. Furthermore, we assume that (as seen in the
simulation) in the long-run the weight of ash is onstant (wCt−1 = w
C
).
14
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Figure 6: Panel 1: Pries Pt and fundamental value Ft with memory λ = 0.95;
Panel 2: Attrativeness with memory λ = 0.95; Panel 3: Pries Pt and
fundamental value Ft with memory λ = 0.99; Panel 4: Attra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As already explained, this seond approah is loser to our simulation results.
The long run attrativeness of the ative trading strategy basially depends
on the management osts, as well as the weight of ash and the risk-free rate.
It requires the risk-free return weighted with its portfolio share to be higher
than the managing osts
21
:
wC · rf > κ (21)
Moreover, given this ondition, starting from equation 20 we an alulate
the time it takes for ative traders to take over the market:
t ≥
wC · p
rf · wC − κ
=
p
rf −
κ
wc
(22)
This results onrms that in times of high management osts κ, low ash
weights wC , and low risk-free interest rates rf the bubble last longer. Fur-
21
Note that this ondition was satised in our rst simulation results.
15
thermore, a stronger bubble (as haraterized by higher values of p) also lasts
longer.
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We now want to investigate these bak of the envelope alulations based
upon numerial simulations. First, we vary the parameters management osts
κ and risk-free rate rf with xed random seeds (see gure 5). As predited
by the alulations, high management osts as well as low risk-free rates
eteris paribus lengthen the boom periods resulting from the dierene in
attrativeness. Similar results emerge if we vary the memory λ of the agent
as shown in gure 6. Long-term thinking as aounted for by high values
of λ lengthens the boom and bust periods and thereby dereases market
volatility. Tehnially, this an be explained the longer time it takes for the
attrativeness of ative and passive trading to interset.
By assuming rf = 0.01% and κ = 0.02% and keeping everything else
equal, we violated ondition 21. This means that in this onguration passive
trading is more attrative than ative trading. In gure 7, we take both
16
assumptions and apply them to the model with the Sharpe Ratio. Compared
to our rst simulation with Sharpe Ratio depited in gure 4 this dramatially
hanges the results: the market is dominated by passive traders and most of
the time at a bubbly equilibrium.
In the next setion we want to determine the behavior of the other be-
havioral parameters and also more intensively disuss the bubble and bust
dynamis.
5 States and dynamis of bubbles and busts
Numerial simulations onrmed the existene of two regimes. In the rst
regime there are only ative traders (WA = 1). In this steady state there are
no hanges in the portfolio omposition of investors (DW P = 0). The steady
state an be alulated starting from the following equation:
p˙ = µ(1 · dA + wC · 0) = µ(α(f − p− rf) + a) (23)
By setting noise to its expeted value of zero (E(a) = 0), the steady state
(p˙ = 0) an be derived22:
p˙ = 0 = µ(α(f − p− rf ))⇒ p = f − rf ⇒ P ≈
F
1 + rf
(24)
This means pries equal fundamentals disounted with the risk-free rate. The
bubble senario is the more interesting ase. Here ative traders have zero
market weight (WA = 0)
23
. Meanwhile there is ight to the passive trading
strategy DW Pt resulting in the following prie equation:
p˙ = µ(0 · dA + wCDW P ) = µ · wC
W˙ P
τ
(25)
Sine in the asent of a bubble the weight of passive traders hanges from
zero to one, we an insert W˙ P = 1. Therefore, the bubbly equilibrium an
be haraterized as follows
24
:
p =
µwC
τ
(26)
22
To transform the log-values bak to real values, we assume the rst-order approxima-
tion for the interest rate log(1 + rf ) = rf .
23
The simulation results still plots their demand positions dAt in the market. Their
fundamental trading strategy suggest them to inur short positions in the positive bubble.
However, sine they have no market weight at the urrent situation they do not engage in
trading.
24
This results is derived by assuming that the initial prie equals the fundamental value
p0 = 0, whih is the ase for ative traders only (W
A = 1) and a negletable daily risk-free
rate (rf ≈ 0).
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Note that by assuming that log-fundamental value is zero (f = 0), the log-
prie an be interpreted as a perentage deviation from fundamentals. This
implies that this bubbly equilibrium is higher for illiquid markets (high values
for µ) in whih investors realloate their portfolios with a high frequeny (low
values for τ). Combining the results of equation 26 and 22 we an also make
a statement about the length of the bubble:
t ≥
µwC
τ(rf −
κ
wC
)
(27)
This ondition delares that illiquid markets (high values of µ) with strong
swithing speed of bounded rational investors (low values for τ) are subjet
to longer lasting bubbles. In pratie, this is espeially the ase for emerging
markets. The result for the weight of ash is ambiguous. Strong ash holdings
lead to stronger exess demand of the passive fund for the risky asset leading
to a stronger bubble whih is more persistent. On the other side, strong
ash weights (given the ondition wCrf > κ) make the ative strategy more
attrative leading to a stronger reswithing. The ash weight for a minimum
length bubble period is wC
∗
= 2κ
rf
25
.
Figure 8 further investigates the variation of dierent behavioral parame-
ters. In the rst panel, we show pries with dierent degrees of rationality γ.
As pointed out in equation 16, this parameter links the attrativeness with
the market weight and thereby also with the ow between trading strategies.
High rationality amplies the ow between strategies and thereby shortens
the length of the boom/fundamental periods also leading to inreased nan-
ial volatility. This result ontradits the ndings of Fisher (2011) investi-
gating the eet of rationality in a fundamentalist/hartist-framework as a
reation to news fundamentals and showing that high rationality γ inreases
nanial stability. In the ontext of Fisher (2011), higher rationality in-
reases the speed at whih pries onverge to the new steady state with a
dierent fundamental value. In our ase, however, we do not have a single
steady state but two. High rationality thereby inreases the swithing be-
tween these states. The positive skewness in return distribution an also be
alluded to the swithing mehanism presented as a tanh-funtion. The pries
are mainly driven by the ow between funds. In fat, the returns (being the
derivative of log-pries) are proportional to the derivative of relative weights
as presented in equation 16
26
. The onavity of the tanh-funtion leads to the
25
This result an be derived with standard derivation for a loal minimum
∂t
∂wC
!
= 0 and
∂2t
∂wC2
|wC
∗
> 0.
26
The prie equation using the dierene in attrativeness approah an be presented
in the form of the following dierential equation: p˙ = µ2
[
(1−m)dA + m˙wC
]
.
18
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Figure 8: Model with attrativeness Panel 1: Pries Pt with variation of ra-
tionality γ; Panel 2: Pries Pt with variation of reevaluation time of portfolio
τ ; Panel 3: Pries Pt with variation of memory λ; Panel 4: Pries Pt with
variation of ative traders aggressiveness α
fat that investors strongly swith into the passive strategy going along with
strong positive returns. The ow out of the passive strategy on the other
side is rather slow resulting in low absolute values for the negative returns.
Furthermore, we vary the rebalaning time τ . Note that the ase with
τ = ∞ represents the ase with no rebalaning and therefore with ative
trading-only. In this ase, prie movements follow a random walk around
fundamentals as indued by the noise trading of ative traders. As demon-
strated in the alulations, the low rebalaning time inreases the size of the
bubble as well as its length.
The weight of ash wC is an important soure of nonlinearities in the
model. In a senario where ative traders are strongly invested in the risky
asset, the two regimes do not emerge. This an be explained by the fat
that in this framework the destabilizing ow into passive funds leading to
the bubble an be oset by the stabilizing trading of ative fundamental
traders. When, however, a ertain threshold is rossed, the bipolar senario
19
emerges. As already presented, strong ash holdings also inrease the size
and the length of the bubble.
Lastly, we vary the risk aversion of ative traders. High risk aversion of
ative traders (as implied by low values for α) an eventually also produe
negative bubbles (pries lower than warranted by fundamentals). This is
beause ative traders do not stem strongly against undervaluation of the
risky asset. Moreover, high risk aversion of ative traders also dereases
positive bubbles. Sine ative traders are not very aggressive, their ation
does not ontribute to high returns whih in a seond round eet does not
ontribute to a strong swithing to the passive strategy driving the positive
bubble.
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Figure 9: Model with Sharpe Ratio Panel 1: Pries Pt with variation of ra-
tionality γ; Panel 2: Pries Pt with variation of reevaluation time of portfolio
τ ; Panel 3: Pries Pt with variation of memory λ; Panel 4: Pries Pt with
variation of ative traders aggressiveness α
We now repeat the same simulations now with non-risk-neutral investors
valuing a strategy based upon its Sharpe Ratio (see gure 9). The results
of the risk-neutral ase are mostly reprodued. High rationality γ enfores
20
reswithing and therefore also market volatility
27
. The same holds true for
short rebalaning times τ . The most interesting result is visible for variation
for weight of ash in the ative traders portfolio. Very low ash holdings
of ative traders makes their strategy unattrative (as presented in equation
21) leading to strong positions of passive traders going along with a bubble.
On the other side, high ash weight leads to strong bubbles as presented in
equation 26. High aggressiveness of ative traders α (low risk aversion) in-
reases nanial volatility, while low aggressiveness leads to negative bubbles.
Therefore both, too little and too muh risk aversion of arbitrage traders, are
not beneial for nanial markets.
The model is still highly stylized. Therefore, any poliy onlusions have
to be taken with a pinh of salt. The model suggests that, even without
the presene of hartist traders, market pries an be above fundamentals.
This is espeially the ase if bounded rational investors an quikly swith
their portfolios between ative and passive holdings. Plain vanilla ETFs that
atually hold their underlying assets and an be exhanged quikly (low τ in
the model sense) introdue a positive feedbak behavior in the markets
28
. A
nanial transation tax in the sense of Tobin (1978) on private speulation
might redue the problem of quik swithing of assets (low values of τ) and
therefore lower the dimension of the bubble. On the other hand, a Tobin tax
in the primary market will lower its liquidity (high values for µ) and thereby
inrease the bubbly outome.
6 Summary and outlook
The main result of the model presented is that market pries an be above
fundamental value even though the market only onsists of stabilizing fun-
damental traders and passive buy and hold traders. The rationale is that
bounded rational investors swith to a passive investment strategy beause
of reent prie inreases. This eet is emphasized if we assume that agents
frequently revalue the portfolio and reshift strong proportions of their asset
holdings. Investment ompanies have to reate shares of passively invested
funds (e.g., ETFs) by buying the underlying shares. In ontrast to the passive
funds that only holds risky asset, atively managed funds have an optimized
portfolio of risk-free and risky assets. Therefore, the ow of investor money
from atively managed to passive funds reates exess demand for the risky
27
One again, to keep the results of the model with attrativeness and Sharpe Ratio
omparable, we saled down the rationality parameter with the fator 20.
28
Note that, as already argued in the rst setion, syntheti ETFs might, on the other
hand, impose severe risks on the nanial system by exposing holders to ounterparty risk.
asset leading to higher stok pries. We showed that ative funds an only
be suessful if they harge low management osts. Moreover, they have a
stronger market weight in downturns sine they are also invested in a risk-
free asset. The size of the bubble mainly depends on the illiquidity of the
market and the rebalaning time of the bounded rational investors. A Tobin
tax might be beneial by reduing the trading ativity on the seondary
market, but also leads to higher illiquidity on the primary whih in turn in-
reases the size of the positive bubble. Negative bubbles only seem to our
in the ase that ative traders are very risk-averse.
This model is still highly stylized. A onsequential extension would be
the introdution of a destabilizing trend-following strategy. If, on the other
hand, we expliitly model the market for risk-free asset a stabilizing eet
is be expeted. The rationale for this is that if ative traders believe that
the risky asset is overvalued, they sell them and start holding risk-free asset.
The inreased demand for risk-free asset inates its prie and thereby redues
the risk-free returns. This again leads to a reshift into the risky asset by
ative traders and thereby has a stabilizing eet. A strong prie reation
by the risk-free market to exess demand thereby ats similarly to a high
risk aversion of ative traders by reduing the reshifting between risky and
risk-free asset. These further extensions will also provide a more rigorous
framework for evaluating poliy deisions.
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